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ABSTRACT 
Today multinational firms face grave uncertainties with respect to 
their investment strategies in other countries. Ths paper stresses the 
importance of integrating the descriptive aspects of this problem with 
prescriptive recommendations. It does so by raising two broad interre- 
lated questions: 
(1) How do multinational firms and insurers deal with the problems 
of international risk in making their decisions on what invest- 
ments to undertake? 
(2) What role can analytic approaches, including insurance mechan- 
isms, play in better managing risk and uncertainty in interna- 
tional transactions? 
These questions are addressed by developing a conceptual frame- 
work which emphasizes the importance of problem formulation, institu- 
tional arrangements and decision processes as a basis for prescriptive 
recommendations. The problem is characterized by lack of a detailed 
statistical data base to estimate probabilities and consequences of dif- 
ferent types of political, economic, and social risks. Corporate planners 
and risk managers who have responsibility for these investment decisions 
are anxious to avoid uncertainty. Hence, their actions appear to be 
greatly influenced by past experience and personal contacts. 
Our prescriptive recommendations are designed to widen the statist- 
ical data base by the use of experts and Bayesian analysis as well as to 
broaden the responsibility for investment decisions withn the organiza- 
tion. We also propose a jointly operated private-federal insurance pro- 
gram whlch maintains features of current government operated systems 
but has private firms marketing policies and settling claims. 
The above theoretical concepts are illustrated with a case study of 
Indonesia's investment evaluation problem pursuant to their decision to 
provide the United States with liquefied natural gas in the early 1970's. 
This case study illustrates the political risks of firms investing even in 
hlghly developed economies such as the United States. 
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INSURING AGAINST INTERNATIONAL HAZARDS: 
DESCRJPTIYE AND PRESCRIPTIVE ASPECTS 
Howard Kunreuther 
Paul Kleindorfer 
Multinational firms face grave uncertainties today with respect to 
their investment strategies in other countries. In particular, there has 
been an increasing awareness by international managers of the difficulty 
of predicting the future political and economic climate which is likely to 
exist in a foreign country. One only'has to look at the following headlines 
from The Economist during the first few months of 1981 to see graphically 
the types of uncertainties which exist in different parts of the world: 
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Iran and Iraq: A New Front in a Slow War? (January 3, 1981) 
El Salvador: Final Offensive to the Next? (January 17, 1981) 
Ecuador and Peru: The Oil War (February 7, 1081) 
Poland: A Shaky Kmd of Peace (March 21, 1981) 
Arab-Israel Conflict: Steam from the Middle East's Back 
Burner (March 28, 1981) 
American companies have received only limited protection from US 
government supported insurance programs so they have been forced to 
turn to a few relatively inexperienced private insurers for coverage to 
self-insure against potential hazards in foreign countries. Economists are 
predicting, however, that more insurers will enter the market in the near 
future and that multinational f rms  will become more knowledgeable 
about their needs. Hence, they expect insurance coverage to expand and 
premiums to drop dramatically ( . e s s  Week 1981). 
The above illustrative examples on the unstable world situation cou- 
pled with the increasing interest by multinational firms in investing 
abroad have motivated two broad questions which t h s  paper addresses: 
(1) How do multinational firms and insurers deal with the problems 
of international risk in making their decisions on what invest- 
ments to undertake in foreign countries? 
(2) What role can analytic approaches, including insurance mechan- 
isms, play in better managing risk and uncertainty in interna- 
tional transactions? 
The first question is of a descriptive nature, while the second one has 
a prescriptive flavor. A basic theme of this paper is the importance of 
undertaking descriptive analysis before making prescriptive recommen- 
dations. In the next section we develop a conceptual framework wluch 
highlights the importance of integrating these two components of the 
analysis. Sections 111 and IV probe into the actual decision processes util- 
ized by firms and insurers in coping with international risk (Question I). 
The concluding section addresses ways to improve the process (Question 
2). 
In order to make the analysis more concrete we will illustrate the 
theoretical concepts with an actual problem facing Indonesia: whether to 
provide the United States with liquefied natural gas. We hypothesize that 
countries planning to invest in the United States may face similar types 
of political and economic risks as do American-based firms who are con- 
templating projects in less-developed areas of the world. If this is true, 
then there may be lessons to be learned from the way other countries 
deal with these hazards. 
II. A CONCEPTUAL FWUDWORK 
The framework which guides our analysis is depicted in Figure 1. We 
will illustrate each of the elements in turn indicating how descriptive 
analysis is linked with prescriptive recommendations. 
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Figure 1. Elements of Conceptual Framework 
PROBLEM FORMULATI ON 
Before undertaking a detailed analysis one needs to identify and 
define the problem. The problem of managing international risks revolves 
around the uncertainties associated with the future political and 
economic climate in the countries in which an investment is contem- 
plated. There is a growing literature on this subject which elaborates on 
the types of uncertainties that multinational firms and insurers face in 
their investment decisions. We will classify them under four different 
types of risk, none of which are mutually exclusive from the others. 
Political Risk 
This type of risk revolves around the instability associated with a 
.particular country. Some of the possible consequences which come 
under t h s  general heading are 
inconvertibility of currency 
expropriation of facilities 
war, revolution or insurrection (West 19BO), 
Not all investments are affected by these political risks in the same way 
since potential losses are partially determined by the level of technology, 
organizational structure of the firm as well as the formal linkages 
between the firm and the foreign government. Kobrin (1981) points out 
that the political environment is likely to be less risky for "a consumer 
products producer with minimal investment and production that is gen- 
erally not integrated worldwide than for a petrochemical producer with 
considerable fixed investment and globally rationalized operations" 
(p.254). 
Firms who are contemplating an investment subject to approval at 
the local, municipal and state governmental level must also be concerned 
with the social climate within the foreign country. One only has to wit- 
ness the changing history of nuclear power to recognize that what 
appeared to be an investment which would be tacitly approved by the 
public in the 1950s and 1960s has been viewed very differently in recent 
years (Hohenemser e t  al.. 1977). 
Economic r isk  
With respect to investments in physical facilities one must consider 
the likelihood and consequences of changing world market conditions and 
price fluctuations over time. For example, the success of investments in 
any type of energy source is critically dependent on the available supply 
of other products and future demand for t h s  particular source. 
If one is considering making a loan to a foreign country there are 
additional economic risks associated with such a financial commitment. 
Eaton and Gersovitz (1980) distinguish between three types of behavior 
which may create problems for the lender. 
1. The borrower can repudi.de the loan by refusing to pay interest 
and/or principal as originally agreed. 
2. The borrower can defaul t  on the loan by failing to comply with 
the terms of the loan agreements (e.g., skipping payments). 
3. There can be a rescheduling of the loan through an explicit 
agreement between the relevant parties as to how payments of 
interest and/or principal should be modified. 
Safety and Environmental Risk 
Here we are referring to direct losses to the investment itself and 
the indirect consequences to others. Natural disasters, such as floods, 
earthquakes, or fire, can cause severe destruction to a facility or plant. 
There can also be man-made dsasters such as explosions whch can dam- 
age the facility and may also kill or severely injure employees or individu- 
als residing nearby. There are also a set of qualitative risks such as pollu- 
tion, noise, environmental degradation which may be created by a partic- 
ular project. The firm investing their money in the project or the poten- 
tial insurers will want to know the extent of their liability from any of 
these negative impacts. 
The potential investment by a multinational firm will involve only 
some of the risks outlined above. It is important for the relevant 
interested parties to identify these elements of uncertainty as a prelude 
to analyzing their decision. 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
There is a need to identify the relevant interested parties who are 
involved in the decision process. Figure 1 indicates the three principal 
actors who deserve attention with respect to the problem of managing 
international risk. 
Host Countrjy 
We will assume there is an expressed interest by this party in having 
funds invested. In many cases the host ,country may not be able to give 
complete assurance that the particular investment will be approved, as 
indicated by the above discussion of social risks. Once the project is 
completed there may be political, economic, and safety risks which influ- 
ence its relative success. 
Investor  
Multinational firms often have the option of investing in a number of 
different projects, each of which will be viewed &fferently. Funds can be 
allocated for modernization or expansion of an existing enterprise in a 
host country, for a new facility, or for exploration of natural resources 
(e.g., gas, oil, minerals). The project can be jointly owned by the investor 
and a firm in the host country or it can be controlled entirely by the 
investing firm. With respect to the organizational structure, corporate 
investment planners have the responsibility for collecting data and judg- 
ing the relative attractiveness of specific projects. They are frequently 
assisted by outside experts who have specialized knowledge of the host 
countries (Rummel and Heenan 1978). 
For reasons discussed below, few private companies have marketed 
insurance covering financial losses from foreign investments. In most 
countries there is some type of government insurance firm which has 
been established for thls purpose. For example, in the United States the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) can insure projects in 
less-developed countries or areas where there are bilateral agreements 
between the U.S. and the forelgn host that recognize OPIC's rlghts. 
Before providing coverage OPlC must determine that suitable arrange- 
ments exist to protect its interest with respect to any insured project 
(West 1980, p. lo). 
In 1971, France set up two systems to protect the foreign invest- 
ments of their compagies, one managed by its foreign trade bank BFCE 
(Banque Francaise pour le Commerce Exterieur) and the other by the 
COFACE (Compagnie Francaise dlAssurance a 1'Exportation) (Chavlier and 
Hirsch 1981). COFACE guarantees the total amount of the credit (BFCE 
plus private portion) for a rate premium of approxirnately'8.85 percent. 
The Central Banks of other developing countries frequently provide loan 
guarantees which enable investors to obtain funds from the eurocurrency 
market in currencies not native to their country. 3 
'similar governmental agencies providing insurance against expropriation inconvertibility, 
war, revolution, insurrection exist in Canada, Japan, Norrrtiy, Denmark, Australia, the Nether 
lands, West Germany, Sweden, and Great Britain. Many of these agencies also offer invest- 
ment guarantee programs which coordinate at the federal level agreements between 
capital-importing and capital-exporting countries concerning compensation for expropria- 
tion, and which also provide prompt interim relief to firms which suffer expropriation and 
other disruptions. 
PROCESSES 
By decision processes we mean the collection and evaluation of data 
as a basis for determining whether or not to invest in a particular project. 
In the discussion which follows we will concentrate on the decision 
processes of the investing firm and insurer. The uncertainties facing 
them will, of course, be related to the behavior of the host country. A s  
shown in Figure 1 there are three elements whch form the basis of our 
analysis of the international risk problem: 
Estimation 01 Frob abilities and Losses 
Before each interested party can evaluate the relative attractiveness 
of a particular investment there needs to be a clear understanding of the 
elements of uncertainty. We will utilize the language of decision analysis 
to structure the problem, although we recognize that in practice individu- 
als and firms may not undertake such a formal approach. 
Consider a particular project which has been proposed by a host 
country to a multinational firm. In Figure 2 we consider a specific invest- 
ment, Project A, where there are n possible events which can occur, each 
one producing a specific outcome. The investor assigns probability Qi to 
each event i and C; to the consequence if thls event occurs. Some events 
(e.g., political or economic stability) will yield positive profits whde others 
(e.g., social conflict) may produce losses. 
Fgure 2. Events and Consequences of Firm's Investment Decision. 
A similar tree could be constructed for the insurer in evaluating out- 
comes if he insures Project A, but h s  perception of the probability of an 
event may differ from that of the investor. I t  is also possible that the firm 
and insurer may experience different consequences if a particular event 
occurs. For example, suppose that an investor was fully insured against 
the possibility of expropriation by the host country. If this event 
occurred then the firm would file for a claim and the financial loss would 
be borne entirely by the insurer. 
One of the principal problems facing investors and insurers is the 
lack of a detailed statistical data base for estimating probabilities and 
consequences of different events. There are thus likely to be systematic 
biases based on past experience which play an important role in this esti- 
mation process. 
Allocation of Responsibility 
In their classic study of the behavioral theory of the firm, Cyert and 
March (1963) noted that each part of the organization has a set of 
independent goals and constraints which guide their actions. We 
hypothesize that this feature of the organizational structure plays a key 
role in the foreign investment decision by many firms. Corporate invest- 
ment planners are responsible for the outcomes of their decisions with 
respect to particular projects. Any specific action on their part requires 
some justification to others, so that if there is a negative outcome they 
can protect themselves from being penalized. There is thus a reliance on 
experts for advice as well as a tendency for investment planners to favor 
projects in foreign countries where they feel they understand the situa- 
tion very well. 
Rsk managers in private insurance firms are likely to have similar 
concerns about offering coverage to multinational corporations particu- 
larly if the data base on which they must estimate premiums may not be 
representative of future probabilities and consequences associated with a 
specific set of events. Rather than assume the responsibility for such a 
risky decision, few private insurance firms have opted to provide protec- 
tion against foreign investments. 
Avoidance 01 Uncertainty 
Organizations prefer to avoid uncertainty by developing decision 
rules which enable them to avoid collecting information on future events 
(Cyert and March 1963). For t b s  reason investors are llkely to uthze 
threshold models of choice, whereby projects are only approved if the 
corporate risk manager perceives the chances of a given event to be 
below an acceptable risk level. If the problem is structured in t b s  way, 
firms avoid undertaking a detailed analysis of the consequences of dif- 
ferent events. Let i9f be the acceptable risk level for each event i which 
produces negative outcomes. Their decision rule under a threshold 
model is simply: accept if each i9, S c ~ :  otherwise reject the project. 
Insurance firms face additional problems of uncertainty if they 
decide to offer protection against certain investments. Two phenomena 
which constrain their behavior are problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard. 
Adverse selection is caused by the inability of insurance firms to 
discriminate between different types of risks. The insurer may thus 
attract a portfolio of investors whose expected performance is worse than 
the average. He thus opens himself up to unanticipated losses. By recog- 
nizing this possibility the insurer raises tus premiums, thus restricting 
the market even further. Eventually, the rates may be so high that only 
the poorest risks, if any, are willing to insure and the market fails. This 
spiral effect has been discussed widely in the economics and insurance 
literature (see Arrow 1971). For adverse selection to occur, investors 
must have better information on the nature of their risks than private 
insurance firms. 
The moral hazard problem is a variation on the above theme. After 
investors protect their investment with insurance, they may be less con- 
cerned with its success than if they had to bear the entire risk them- 
selves. If insurers do not anticipate these behavioral consequences then 
their premiums will be inadequate to cover expected losses. We will dis- 
cuss the nature of adverse selection and moral hazard in more detail in 
Section 11. 
PRESCRIPTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 
Once a descriptive analysis of the problem has been completed, it 
may be possible for the analyst to recommend ways of improving the 
situation. One of the most difficult tasks here is to develop measures of 
performance with which to judge the outcomes of alternative policies. 
Here we are confronting the tradeoffs between efficiency and equity that 
have become so prominent in the recent literature on social choice and 
policy analysis. By efficiency we are referring to an allocation of scarce 
resources so that given the available alternatives it is impossible to 
increase one output without giving up some of at  least one other. By 
equity we are referring to distributional considerations whch may sug- 
gest that certain interested parties receive a different share of goods and 
services than that specified by an efficient allocation of resources (Sto- 
key and Zeckhauser 1978). We are not concerned in t h s  paper with 
resolving equity/efficiency tradeoffs. Rather the paper will focus on ways 
to improve the decision processes of investors and insurers. 
In the case of international risk, the private market is likely to be 
imperfect because of difficulties in estimating probabilities and conse- 
quence s, allocation of responsibility in the organization and uncertainty 
avoidance by firms. In addition there are political constraints whch may 
come into play regarding investments in other countries whch directly 
involve the government. Schelling (1981) has provided an interesting per- 
spective on this latter issue by showing how the pricing system cannot be 
utilized i f  governmental bodies have partial responsibility for the out- 
comes of specific decisions. These issues generally raise the prescriptive 
question as to how best to institutionalize the provision of insurance cov- 
erage between government and private insurers. This is an issue we 
address in some detail below. 
In. HOW F7RMS AND INSURERS DEAL WlTH INTERNATIONAL RISK 
In this section we will utilize the conceptual framework to provide 
more detail on the decision processes that firms and insurers are likely 
to utilize in coping with the problems of international risk. We will 
motivate our discussion with a real world example: the problem faced by 
Indonesia as to whether they would invest financial resources into con- 
structing facilities for shipping liquefied natural gas (LNG) abroad. In 
particular, we will focus on the question "Should Indonesia enter into a 
formal contract with United States firms to supply a specific quantity of 
LNG over the next 20 years?" We will construct simplified models of the 
decision process based on this particular problem to illustrate our points, 
even though we are aware that the actual decision making process is far 
more complicated than our treatment may imply. This exercise should 
thus be viewed as a starting point for stimulating future research as to 
how analysis can be made more realistic. 
PROBLEM FORMULATION 
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a potential source of energy which 
requires a fairly complicated technological process that has the potential, 
albeit with very low probability, of creating severe losses. For purposes of 
transportation, natural gas can be converted to liquid form at about 
1/600 its gaseous volume. I t  is shipped in specially constructed tankers 
and received a t  a terminal where it undergoes regasification and is then 
transported through pipelines to transmission systems where it is distri- 
buted to residences and business establishments. 
Indonesia became a logical source of gas supply to other countries 
after Mobil Oil lndonesia announced in late 1971 that they had discovered 
large reserves of natural gas in northern Sumatra (i.e., the Arun field). 
Both the United States and Japan expressed interest in buying Indonesia 
LNG. The principal decision facing Pertamina, the Indpnesia state-owned 
oil company, was whether they wanted to invest approximately $900 mil- 
lion in the construction of a liquefaction storage and loading facility for 
shipping LNG abroad. 
The primary risk facing Pertamina was the possibility of project 
failure after significant amounts of money had been spent on facilities. In 
the case of the United States there would be some chance that a receiv- 
ing site would not be approved in California, (the state whch would 
receive the LNG) or that there would be long delays in the final approval 
process. Since the proposed contract was for 20 years there was some 
concern that LNG be marketable over t b s  period due to the uncertainty 
about the future of world energy prices. Given the large investment costs 
in Indonesian LNG facilities all of which are borne by Pertamina, this 
question as to the stability of future markets had considerable impor- 
tance. 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Each real world problem involving foreign investment has a special 
set  of institutional arrangements which reflect the regulatory and politi- 
cal structure of the involved countries. In our specific example the inves- 
tor, Pertamina, could only enter into any contract on shipping LNG 
abroad after it was approved by the Indonesian government. With respect 
to the host country, the United States, two gas utilities in California 
(Pacific Lqhting Corporation and Pacific Gas and Electric) formed a 
partnership to import LNG from Indonesia through a subsidiary PacIn- 
donesia. Any contract signed between PacIndonesia-Pertamina was sub- 
ject to approval by the Federal Power commission. 
Other parties also had a stake in the final decision. For large scale 
investments such as LNG facilities a substantial portion of the required 
funds are provided by long-term loans at  moderate rates of interest. The 
lenders, who include banks and insurance companies, utilize other 
people's money and thus are obliged to repay in full. Hence before 
undertakmg the financing of any project such as an LNG regasification 
facility, they require some form of insurance against possible losses from 
the risks listed above. In the case of Indonesia, lenders to Pertamina, 
which included the eurocurrency market, were guaranteed repayment of 
any financial loss by the Indonesia Central Bank (Office of Technology 
Assessment 1980). 
DECISION PROCESSES OF INVESTORS 
Use oJ Deckion Trees 
Let us first turn to the question of how the investor is likely to evalu- 
ate whether to  commit funds to a particular project. In the case of Per- 
tamina their decision was undoubtedly influenced by their estimate of the 
probability that California would approve the siting of an LNG terminal. 
Pertamina was entirely a t  risk with respect to the investment costs of 
their liquefaction and loading faci1ities.l For illustrative purposes sup- 
pose that their estimate of the probability of California not siting a facil- 
ity was = .05. Should this scenario develop we assume that they would 
lose their entire investment of $900 million. If California did construct a 
receiving terminal then they anticipate that their total discounted profits 
profit on the investment would be $270 million. Pertamina knows that if 
it doesn't invest in Liquefaction facilities it could invest its resources in 
alternative earnings opportunities, whch we assume are known to yield 
$180 million with certainty. 
4~ force majeure clause in that contract absolved the United States from any obligation to 
pay for gas should a facility not be sited. 
The relevant branches and outcomes for the decisions "Invest in LNG 
Facilities" and "Don't Invest in LNG Facilities" are depicted in Figure 3. If 
one was using the criterion of maximizing expected or average return on 
investment then the LNG facilities would be deemed a t t r a c t i ~ e . ~  In real- 
ity, the actual situation is much more complicated than the simple tree 
of Figure 3. There are questions with respect to the final terms of the 
contract, the future prices of different forms of energy and the uncertain 
costs in constructing the liquefaction and leading facility. Each of these 
factors could be represented in a more complicated decision tree and 
Pertamina would then be faced with estimating the probabilities and 
consequences of a more detailed decision tree. 
U.S. Sites Terminal (+270) 
Invest in LNG Facility = 0.95 
U.S. Does Not Site Terminal 
= 0.05 (-900) 
Do Not Invest in LNG Facility 
Figure 3. Decision Tree for Evaluating Pertamina's Options. 
As we pointed out in the previous section, the lack of a good statisti- 
cal data base makes it unlikely that Pertamina actually followed this for- 
5 ~ e  expected return for investing in the LNG facilities is simply the sum of probabilities 
times end consequences, i.e., .95($270) + .05(-900) = $21 1.5. Thus, on an expected 
return basis, Pertamina would prefer to invest rather than not (211.5 vs 180). If, however, 
Pertarninti's management were strongly risk averse so there was a high disutility assigned to 
the large loss then the reverse preference might hold. See Raiffa (1986) for a discussion of 
how utilities can be introduced into this analysis. 
ma1 analysis process. We do not know exactly how the company went 
about making its decision but we can suggest factors whch may have 
influenced their data collection and processing activities. Our conjec- 
tures are derived from related research on political risk coupled with 
empirical data on how individuals and firms behave with respect to low 
probability events. 
Systematic m e s  
Due to the lack of a good statistical data base, past experience with 
the host country is likely to be an important element in determining 
whether to invest in a particular project. Most firms feel they do not have 
a good understanding of the relationship between events and managerial 
contingencies from historical data to estimate the probabilities and 
consequences of future events on particular investments. Kobrin (1981) 
points out that impacts of political environments on firms are rarely 
documented with the exception of expropriation. As a result firms Re- 
quently focus on recent events to the exclusion of others in ma* their 
judgments. Undue importance may be placed on dramatic events such as 
a siudent riot or a palace coup which suggests that the country is 
unstable when, in fact, it is not (Rurnmel and Heenan 1978). Economists 
who have studied corporate risk management feel that too much time is 
devoted by multinationals to worrylng about these salient events and not 
enough attention is given to s tudyix  erratic shfts  in forelgn laws and 
regulations which steadily erode corporate profits (Business Week 1981). 
Kelley (1981) provides empirical evidence on the role of past experi- 
ence in the foreign investment decision making process through a study 
of 105 multinational firms, all in the Fortune 500. She points out that if a 
firm has suffered recent losses from political risks, it tends to use a finer 
screen and undertakes a more detailed and sophisticated analysis of t b s  
factor before making future decisions. 
This type of biased behavior on the part of firms has been well docu- 
mented in field survey and controlled laboratory experiments. Tversky 
and Kahneman (1974) have labeled thls phenomenon availability, whereby 
one judges the probability of future events by the ease with which one can 
remember past ones. An example of the availability bias from the field of 
financial investment is provided by Guttentag and Herring ( 198 1). They 
indicate that several European banks (e.g., the Fugger Bank, the Bardi, 
and the Peruzzi) became insolvent during the Middle Ages because they 
lent to sovereigns. These rulers had a history of paying back small loans 
but defaulting on large ones. By focusing only on the number of times 
loans were repaid it appeared as if the sovereign had a favorable record 
while in fact he was a very risky customer. 
Empirical data on consumer decision-making with respect to low pro- 
bability reveals similar behavior. For example, few individuals voluntarily 
protect themselves against the financial consequences of natural hazards 
until after a disaster occurs. Kunreuther, et al. (1978) have documented 
the importance of past experience as a critical variable in the insurance 
purchase decision against flood and earthquakes by statistically analyzing 
data from face to face interviews with 3000 homeowners, half of them 
insured and the other half uninsured. A comment from a homeowner in a 
flood prone area illustrates the importance of past experience in deter- 
mining his attitude toward future coverage: 
I've talked to the different ones that have been bombed out. 
This was their feelings: the $60 in premiums they could use for 
something else. but now they don't care if the figure was $600. 
They're going to take insurance because they have been through 
it twice and learned a lesson from it. (Kunreuther, et al. p.112) 
Similar behavior was observed in earthquake areas of California. Follow- 
ing the Santa Barbara quake of 1978, insurance agents noted that there 
was a sharp increase in demand for coverage (MacDougall 1981). 
The media can play a key role in hghlighting certain events whch 
then increases their salience as perceived by the public. As a result 
there is often a tendency to estimate the probability of a particular event 
to be much higher than it actually is. Combs and Slovic (1978) undertook 
a study of the frequency with which two newspaper reported various 
causes of death. They found that violent deaths such as homicides, 
accidents, and natural disasters were over-reported, while diseases were 
under-reported. These biases in coverage corresponded closely to biases 
found in a previous study (Lichtenstein, e t  al. 1978) in which people were 
asked to judge the frequency of these same causes of death. Their find- 
ings suggest that there may be similar biases with respect to political 
risk if firms focus on headlines as a basis for judging the magnitude of the 
risks facing a particular investment. 
Role of Regret 
The absence of both a detailed statistical data base and a causal 
mot2el of political and economic risk places an enormous responsibility on 
the shoulders of the corporate investment planner. He is likely to be 
highly sensitive to the potential losses if he commits funds to an unsuc- 
cessful project. We hypothesize that one of the important factors 
influencing the decision on whether or not to invest in a particular pro- 
ject is how much the responsible individual will regret each choice on the 
basis of possible outcomes. Bell (1981) has defined the concept of regret 
as the level of assets that the decision maker would have had, i f  a dif- 
ferent decision had been made. 
The simplified choice problem depicted in Figure 3 can be expanded 
to illustrate how regret may enter into the investment planner's choice 
process. As shown in Fgure 4, the choice between investing and not 
investing is characterized by two attributes, the second one indicating 
the amount of money foregone had the other action been taken. 
(+270, +180) 
Invest in LNG Facilities @ = 0.95 
I @2 = 0.05 (-900, + 180) 
(+180, +270) 
@1 = 0.95 
D o  Not  Invest in LNG (+180, -900) 
Facilities @2 = 0.05 
Flgure 4. Regret as Part of Pertamina's Decision Tree. 
Before recommending that Pertamina invest in LNG facilities the 
planner would compare the outcomes under both branches of the tree 
"Invest in LNG facility," with the return from a certain investment (i.e., 
t l80) .  Bell discusses the case where regret is an additive function, that 
is, where regret is the difference between the returns on the two options 
under consideration. Hence with = .05 the planner would be subject to 
a regret of 1080 (i.e., 900 + 180), whlch represents the difference between 
the result that did occur and the result that could have been obtained 
had another decision been made (viz, the decision "do not invest"). How- 
ever, if +z were to be obtained, the decision maker would be pleased with 
a positive investment decision, and his regret would be -90 (i.e., 
-2?0+ 180). A similar analysis would be undertaken in evaluating the posi- 
tive and negative elements of regret in the decision "Do not invest in LNG 
facilities ." 
If regret is an important factor in the decision making process then 
the investment planner will base his decision partly on potential returns 
and partly on foregone returns. If the foregone returns are sufficiently 
large and regret is weighed heavily in his process, then the manager may 
prefer not to take the responsibility for having made a "bad" decision 
even if the probability of this outcome is relatively small. 
Regret can be avoided by diffusing the responsibility for taking 
actions to others. Hopple and Kuhlman (1981) point out that firms are 
increasingly relying on country and area specialists in making their deci- 
sions. Investment planners can also utihze personal contacts in the host 
country where an investment is planned. These sources of information 
provide firms with a more detailed rationale for justifying investment 
actions. 
The principal disadvantage of this strategy is that it frequently leads 
to a lack of diverssication across countries because of large transaction 
costs associated with finding experts and personal contacts from many 
. different nations. Guttentag and Herring (1901) note a tendency of banks 
to invest in only a few foreign nations thus opening themselves up to the 
possibility of large losses should a particular government refuse to honor 
forelgn debts. Each investment taken by itself may be sound, but the 
portfolio of projects may be very risky. 
Threshold Models 
An additional way to reduce the possibility of regret is not to under- 
take any actions unless the probability of a failure is below a given thres- 
hold level. This avoidance of uncertainty is very common with respect to 
behavior in both organizational settings as well as individual decision- 
making by risk managers (Borkan and Kunreuther 1979). To illustrate, 
suppose Pertamina used a threshold model for screening out projects. I t  
would then specify an acceptable risk level 9* which would be used as a 
criterion for approving and disapproving a project. If the risk associated 
with failure was less than @ *  then the project would be approved, sub- 
ject to the addtional condtion that the expected rate of return for suc- 
cess was above an acceptable level. If G I  > G *, then the project would be 
rejected no matter how high the rate of return would be. Looking at the 
data in Figure 3, the LNG liquefaction and loading facility would be 
approved if @ *  > .05 and 30 percent was considered an acceptable rate of 
return. 
In a study of 38 companies considering foreign investments, Aharoni 
(1966) provides empirical evidence on the importance of thresholds 
models for initially screening out projects whch have a sufficiently hqh 
risk. Kelley (1981) finds similar behavior on the part of the 105 firms she 
investigated. Investment planners made decisions on the basis of accept- 
able rates of return and acceptable risk levels rather than attempting to 
undertake any type of optimization behavior. Each situation was looked 
at on its own merits without any attempt to undertake any type of port- 
folio or covariance analysis across projects, as would be implied by an 
optimization model. This type of decision rule reduced the costs of col- 
lecting and processing large amounts of data and avoided uncertainty. It 
thus conforms very closely to the hypotheses advanced by Cyert and 
March (1963) in their behavioral theory of the firm. 
The use of threshold models to avoid having to focus on the conse- 
quences of extremely low probability events is utilized by consumers and 
government agencies as well as business organizations. In making their 
insurance decisions, an individual frequently concludes that if the proba- 
bility of a disaster is below some given level @ *  then it won't happen to 
me; hence it is not worth worrying about the potential consequences. In 
such a case insurance protection is not even considered (Slovic, et  al. 
1977; Kunreuther, et  al. 1978). Government regulatory agencies such as 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, use threshold rules on whch to 
evaluate the licensing decision of plants. If they deem the probability of a 
severe accident to be below @ *  then they don't worry about the conse- 
quences (Jackson and Kunreuther 1981). 
Taken together, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that 
multinational firms behave in a manner consistent with concepts from 
the behavioral theory of the firm. The lack of a good statistical data base 
and causal model of risk creates special burdens on the investment 
planner. Actions are justified and regret is avoided through the use of 
experts and personal contacts. Threshold models and acceptable levels 
of performance are also used as a guide to selecting projects. Finally 
there is little effort made to deal with the portfolio of risks--rather each 
project is evaluated on its own merits without comparisons made between 
other potential investments. 
DECISION PROCESSES OF INSURERS 
If an  investment planner could entice private insurance firms to pro- 
tect his investments against political and economic risk then he effec- 
tively shifts responsibility for a loss to another party. As we pointed out 
earlier, few private insurance firms actually offer coverage against inter- 
national risks. Their absence of a good statistical data base and lack of a 
causal model of political risk open them up to problems of adverse selec- 
tion and moral hazard. 
Adverse Selection 
To illustrate adverse selection consider the simplified case where 
there are an equal number of each of two types of projects, low and high 
risk, but the insurer cannot distinguish between them. Low risk projects 
have a probability 9~ of a loss of X dollars while high risk projects face a 
probability aH > QL of a loss of X dollars.' The insurer cannot distinguish 
between the projects and assumes that the probability of a loss is the 
average of the above two probabilities 9 = (aL + QH)/ 2. He bases his 
premium P per dollar coverage on this estimate. 
Figure 5 depicts the phenomenon of adverse selection due to thls 
imperfect information by the insurer. Investment planners are assumed 
to be risk averse, estimate the probability of a loss correctly, and choose 
the optimal amount of insurance whch maximizes their expected utility. 
The demand curves for high and low risk projects are then given by DH 
and DL respectively with full coverage purchased if P s ai ,i = L ,H.  They 
will want to purchase QL units of coverage for low risk projects and QH 
units for high risk investments. The expected loss to the insurer on h g h  
risk projects (shown by the hatched area in Flgure 5) exceeds the 
expected gain (the dotted region) for low risk ones. 
One way for the insurer to counteract the adverse selection problem, 
when he does not have good mformation on the respective risks, is to 
market price-quantity policies. Thls type of insurance system has been 
proposed by Rothschld and Stiglitz (1976) but requires some monitoring 
on the part of insurance firms to ensure that no one attempts to protect 
%e are esrruming that there are only two states of nature: loss of X dollars or no loss. 
itself against a large loss by purchasing multiple low premium-low cover- 
age policies from several &fferent insurers. 7 
Premium 
(Probability) 
Coverage 
QL QH = X 
Figure 5.  The Adverse Selection Process. 
? Kleindorfer and Kunreuther (1981) have investigated the robustness of these types of 
price-quantity policies for the case where potential insured hdividuals rnisperceive the pro- 
babilities of a loss. 
Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard refers to an increase in the probability of a loss 
because the investment firm's or the country's have modified their 
behavior solely as a result of the insurance purchase decision. In addi- 
tion, the insurer is assumed not to have anticipated or to  have underes- 
timated this increased probability. For example, if the host country feels 
less responsibility toward the investing firm because it knows that some- 
one else will cover its potential losses, then this would create a moral 
hazard problem unless the insurer was also aware of this structural 
change. How prevalent this type of situation actually is in the real world 
is an empirical question worth pursuing. 
The moral hazard problem is illustrated in Figure 6 for a set of to low 
risk projects, each of whch is assumed to have a probability of i P L  that it 
will fail. The investment planners purchase iPL units of insurance a t  P 
dollars per unit. Once coverage is purchased the insurer is surprised to 
find that the actual probability of a project failure has increased to i P H  so 
that he suffers an  expected loss for each project shown by the cross 
hatched area in Flgure 6. 
Premium 
(Probability) 
Coverage 
QL X 
Flgure 6. The Moral Hazard Problem. 
W. THE LNG SITING DECISION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Let us now return to the specific uncertainty facing Pertamina: 
determining the probability that the United States will actually site an 
LNG receiving terminal in California. There are great &fficulties in pro- 
viding an estimate of this probability because of the complex nature of 
the decision making process in the U.S. with respect to the siting of 
large-scale technologies such as nuclear power plants or LNG terminals. 
For one thmg, the decision affects many different individuals and 
groups in society rather than being confined to the normal relationshp of 
a private market transaction such as when a consumer purchases food or 
an appliance from a store or firm. In the sit~ng decision, each of these 
groups has its own objectives, attributes, data base and constraints (Kee- 
ney 1980). 
In the case of the LNG terminal in California there were several dif- 
ferent parties who were concerned with the siting decision: First, the 
8 applicant for the terminal (Western LNG Terminal Associates) Second, 
government agencies at  the federal state and local level: the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) determines whether a proposed 
LNG project is in the public interest and should be allowed, the California 
Coastal Commission has the responsibility of protecting the California 
coastline, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) is the princi- 
pal state body involved in power plant issues, and the state legislature 
sets up the rules of the siting process. Finally there are public interest 
groups, represented by the Sierra Club and local citizens groups. 
Each of these different parties interacted with each other a t  dif- 
ferent stages of the decision process with respect to the siting of a termi- 
nal. Their concerns centered around three different classes of attributes: 
economic aspects, environmental aspects and risk aspects. Table 1 dep- 
icts an interested party/concern matrix showing the main attributes con- 
sidered by each of the relevant groups. I t  is clear from this table that 
each of the parties brought to the debate their own special interests. 
' This r e s  a special company set up to represent the LNG siting interests of the three gas 
distribution utilities: Southern California Gas Company, Pacific Gas and Electric and El Paso 
Natural Gas Company. 
T a b l e  1. Par ty -Conce rn  Matrix. 
The applicant's primary concerns are earning profits for sharehold- 
ers and delivering gas reliably to consumers, although there is also a con- 
cern with safety to the population. The federal and state governmental 
agencies concerns were specified by legislation; local government bodies 
determined the economic advantage of a terminal to their community in 
the form of -her tax revenues and employment possibilities and com- 
pared these benefits with environmental costs and risk to their popula- 
tion. Finally the public interest groups focused their attention on the 
environmental and safety risks associated with the proposed project. 
There is thus a potential for conflict between these different parties. 
Another feature of the sit~ng problem is the absence of a statistical 
data base on which to base reliable estimates of the &fierent economic, 
environmental and safety risks associated with a proposed project. 
Experts are likely to differ on their estimates of the consequences of an 
LNG terminal and each of the different parties will use those quantitative 
figures which best suit their purposes. 
Lathrop and Linnerooth (1981) have explored the process of risk 
assessment and provide detailed comparisons of seven major risk assess- 
ments regarding the safety of an LNG terminal in the three sites proposed. 
in California: Los Angeles, Oxnard and Point Conception. They point out 
that the content of each study is largely determined by the use that t b s  
assessment will be given in the political debate. They provide empirical 
data by comparing three risk assessments for Oxnard in some detail. For 
example, a consulting firm, Science Applications Inc. ( SAl) c ommissioned 
to do a risk assessment for the Federal Power Commission estimated the 
probability of a ship accident in the Oxnard harbor to be 5.6 x Socio 
Economic Systems, a consulting firm who undertook a study for the City 
of Oxnard, estimated this same probability to be much larger, i.e. 
For the reasons given above, it is difficult to accurately estimate the 
probability that a site will be chosen. Today, eight years after initial 
applications were filed for three terminals in California, no final decision 
has been made as to whether one will actually be built. The Los Angeles 
facihty was ruled out because of seismic risk and Oxnard was rejected 
because the risk to the population of a catastrophic accident was per- 
ceived to be too h g h .  Only Point Conception still remains a possibility. In 
1978 t h s  site was approved, conditional on it being a seismically safe har- 
bor. The final report on the safety of the facility has not yet been issued 
by the FERC and CPUC. 9 
PERTAMINA'S INVESTMENT STRATEGY 
Despite these uncertainties with respect to the siting decision in the 
United States, Pertarnina decided to invest in a liquefaction and loading 
facility. In taklng thls action Pertamina protected their investment in 
two ways. First, they slgned a contract with Japan to ship LNG from its 
new facility. By diversifying their portfolio, Pertamina was not locked 
into one potential customer. They actually began shpping LNG to Japan 
in August 1977 from their new plant (Wood, 1979). Second, in October 
A detailed description of the Cahfornia siting decision appears in Lathrop (1981) and Lin- 
nerooth (1980). A descriptive model of choice indicating the nature of the political and so- 
cial risks and how they play a role in siting decisions can be found in Kunreuther, Lathrop 
and Linnerooth (1081). 
1977, they renegotiated their contract on a month to month basis with 
Paclndonesia, the United States firm. Pertamina now has the rlght to 
cancel at  any time without any attached penalty. Given the expansion of 
the Japanese market there is now no guarantee that the United States 
will receive LNG from Indonesia even if a terminal in California is 
approved. 
The other uncertainty that Pertamina faced with respect to the pro- 
fitability of their LNG fac&ty is the future of world energy prices. They 
resolved this problem through contract negotiations. Soon after the ini- 
tial contract between Paclndonesia and Pertamina was signed in 1973 the 
world price of oil rose sharply. Since this contract was not tied to an 
increase in energy prices the Indonesian government refused to approve 
it. A final version was eventually approved in 1978. It includes an escala- 
tion clause reflecting changes in the lndonesian crude oil export prices. 10 
In the case of Japan, the initial contract was tied to the price of world oil 
and automatically reflected the increase so it did not have to be renego- 
tiatcd (Western LNG Terminal Associates 1978). 
At an empirical level, we see that Pertamina was able to protect its 
large financial investment by diversifying its portfolio by having Japan as 
another customer and negotiating its contract to  reflect world energy 
prices. The Indonesian government played an important role in the pro- 
cess by refuslng to approve a final contract between Pertamina and its 
customers unless the sellmg price of LNG was competitive with the 
market price. The government also encouraged lenders to provide Per- 
I0F'urther information on this is contained in Ofice of Technology Assessment (1980). 
tamina with funds for the LNG facilities by providing Insurance through its 
Central Bank. 
V. PRESCRIPTIVE SOLUTIONS 
The above descriptive analysis and case study make clear that there 
are several impediments to an efficient sharing of political risks between 
insurers and corporations involved in direct foreign investments. Con- 
cerning firms, the complexities involved in assessing such risks give rise 
to organizational reactions characterized by single project-single country 
myopia, by organizational diffusion of responsibility and regret, and by 
uncertainty avoidance. Such organizational behavior can result in various 
inefficiencies, including improperly diversified investments, problems of 
organizational monitoring and control, and inappropriate protective reac- 
tion to unfolding events. 
These reactions at  the firm level only compound the normal prob- 
lems of providing coverage against large risks by insurers. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the role of insuring political risks has been 
assumed for the most part by government agencies such as the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation in the U.S.  and the Export Development 
Corporation in Canada. One may argue, of course, that some governmen- 
tal involvement in insuring these risks is desirable given their strategic 
ramifications. Nonetheless, private industry has demonstrated signifi- 
cant efficiency advantages over governmental operations in other 
areas.'' It may also be desirable to insulate insurance against 
''see Blankart (1080) for a survey of comparative results on public versus private provision 
international hazards and from the vicissitudes of domestic politics. This 
suggests that one explore ways that the private insurance industry can 
provide such coverage. As a prelude to our own proposals in t h s  regard, 
we first examine how corporations might improve their risk assessment 
procedures, so that they have a better understanding of the hazards for 
whch they seek insurance. 
IMPROVING POLITICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
The descriptive analysis above suggests several areas where political 
risk assessment might be improved. We briefly review here recent 
research of interest under two headings: process improvements and 
organizational design. 
Process Improvements 
It should be recognized that the problem of political risk assessment 
is a special case of the general problem of risk assessment. In recent 
times, the increasing technical and social complexity of industrial society 
has given rise to a concerted research effort to develop publicly and 
scientifically defensible methods for assessing social and technological 
hazards. It would take us too far a field to review this literature here but 
some of its major conclusions deserve stress in the present context. 12 
of goods and semces. These empirical results strongly support the view that private indue 
has cost advantages relative to governmental provision of goods. 
"%cent research on the role of risk assessment in an institutional context can be found in 
Conrad (1 980). 
First, one may broadly describe the process of risk assessment as 
containing two interrelated tasks: 
(1) Determining the structure of the contingent events and deci- 
sions relating to the risk in question. Flgure 3 is a very simple 
example of such a structure. Ths  phase or risk assessment 
describes in so-called "decision-tree" fashon the possible events 
and consequences resulting from different scenarios. 
(2) Estimating the actual values of probabilities and consequences 
of each scenario. 
Concerning the second task, recent research has provided a variety 
of subjective and analytical methods of assessment. However, the more 
fundamental problem in the political risk assessment area is the first 
task, determining the "right" decision tree (i.e., a decision tree whose 
causal links to the risks in question are not just specious). The above 
Indonesian case study indicates how difficult this task is, as it calls for an 
intricate knowledge of the events or scenarios in another country which 
may condition or cause significant political change. Although it would be 
foolish to expect a perfect understanding in advance of such scenarios, 
recent research on corporate planning and risk assessment has shown 
that the use of controlled group methods and new corporate planning 
methodologies can be of help here.13 By a formal analysis of alternative 
assumptions and their consequences, these methods enlarge the set of 
scenarios considered and lend added plausibility and understanding to 
'%ee Ackoff (1974) and Kleindorfer (1981) for a review of recent research on planning 
methods and risk assessment. Zeleny (1879) and Hogarth and Madriakis (1981) discuss re- 
cent field and experimental results on group processes and fore- casting. 
the chains of events which may produce negative outcomes. In the end, 
of course, nothing substitutes for wisdom and intuition of the participants 
in such planning processes. Nonetheless, t h s  research suggests that 
although political risk assessment is intrinsically subjective, one can sub- 
stantially improve even wise intuition by instituting explicit and formal 
procedures. 
One of the most promising assessment procedures for evaluating the 
political risks is SPAIR, an acronym for Subjective Probabilities Asslgned 
to Investment Risks. Ths approach, developed at Shell Oil Company (see 
Meisner 1976 and Gebelein, e t  al. 1978) requires experts to evaluate dif- 
ferent global scenarios (some of which they may generate themselves). 
Each expert provides qualitative judgement on the likelihood that certain 
events such as civil disorder, war, expropriation, price controls, taxation 
changes and export or production restrictions will occur. 
These assessments are then converted into probability estimates on 
the basis of how strongly a particular proposition is supported or refuted 
by the expert. The elicitation technique is similar to the Delphi pro- 
cedure because it uses opinion solicited through a questionnaire. Unlike 
the Delphi method the SPAIR procedure does not force a panel consensus. 
The approach also incorporates a Bayesian updating procedure if 
new information becomes available. For example, suppose that Pertam- 
ina brought in a group of experts to estimate the probability that Califor- 
nia would site an LNG terminal. One individual might have estimated the 
probability that a terminal would n o t  be sited to be = .05. After learn- 
ing that two of the three proposed sites were rejected, he might revise his 
estimate downwards using data on previous real world scenarios as a 
' 4  basis for updating of the probability. - 
Organizational Design Issues 
Many of the problems of country and project myopia observed in 
multinational ' corporatiocs are due to the necessity of organizing cor- 
porate activities around specific (large) projects and geographic regions. 
Oftentimes such specialization represents the appropriate tradeoff 
betwe en responsibility and control in disaggregating corporate world-wide 
activities into manageable chunks. Moreover, political risks form only 
one piece of the more complicated puzzle of business and foregn 
exchange risks for a given geographic region or group of investment pro- 
jects. 
These considerations can be evaluated operationally by considering 
the costs and benefits of alternative organizational designs, e.g., organiz- 
mg by region, by project, or by functional area. Each of these organiza- 
tional forms has certain corporation-specific benefits for the planning 
and control of corporate activities. The final choice of organizational 
structure is then dictated by those dimensions of corporate performance 
which are most critical for responsibility and control. 
Kelley's (1981) analysis of the organizational structure of interna- 
tional operations reveals considerable diversity in the ways in whch firms 
organize, including structuring corporate activities by geographc divi- 
sions (19%), by global product divisions (34%), having international opera- 
1 4 ~  more detailed discussion on how Bayesian techniques can be used to revise political risk 
estimates appears in Hoppie and Kuhlman ed. (1981). 
tions organized under an international division (22%), or by matrix organi- 
zations (23%). Tbs variety reflects the absence of general truths regard- 
ing efficient organizational design. However, the increase in matrix 
organizations over the past decade may reflect attempts by corporations 
to fill in some of the cracks in their primary operational structure. For 
example, organizing by product groups may make sense from an opera- 
tional viewpoint, whereas assessing and monitoring political and forelgn 
exchange risks would be much simpler under a regional organization. 
Combining these two criteria can be accomplished, at  some expense, 
through a matrix organization with primary operational control vested in 
the product group while simultaneously giving a regional coordinator the 
authority to collect and monitor information on all corporate activities in 
a given region. 
Compromise solutions such as matrix organizations have begun to 
prove their worth in coping with a variety of informational and control 
tradeoffs in organizational design.15 Indeed, one may view organizational 
deslgn generally as the evaluation of how different organizational forms 
fare with respect to  competing long- and short-run planning and control 
dimensions. Here, just as with decision process problems, the key to 
improvement is an explicit analysis of alternatives and their conse- 
quences. 
In reviewing the above discussion on prescriptive measures for the 
firm, one may view the fundamental problem of dealing with the risks of 
international hazards to be the cost and/or unavailability of accurate 
'?See Galbraith ( I  073) for a detailed discussion of matrix organizations and their relation- 
ship t o  other organjzational design issues. 
information concerning probabilities and consequences of different 
events, and the organizational responses which such uncertainty evokes. 
In part, these problems are a generic feature of the complexity of doing 
business in the international arena. It is natural, however, to inquire 
whether properly motivated insurers might not promote a more statisti- 
cally informed and efficiently diversified risk sharing in t h s  area than 
individual firms. Some of the reasons this has not taken place to date 
have been noted above. We now take this theme up again and suggest a 
possible improvement to present institutional arrangements through a 
partnershp between the federal government and the private insurance 
industry. 
A JOINT FEDERAL-PRIVATE INSURANCE PROGRAM 
In this section we will propose a program whereby coverage is offered 
to investing firms through the cooperation of a federal government 
agency such as OPIC and the private insurance industry. The principal 
difference between the existing system in the United States and the one 
which we suggest is a provision to allow private insurance firms access to 
government information on country risks, thus providing for more accu- 
rate assessment activities on their part. Let us d~scuss the elements of 
the system in more detail: 
Pooling and Sharing of InfwrnaCion 
One reason that private insurance companies do not provide cover- 
age against international risks is that it is too difficult for them to esti- 
mate accurately the probabilities and losses resulting from different 
events.16 OPIC, on the other hand, has access to political and economic 
intelligence data provided by U.S.  government agencies and U.S. embas- 
sies and consulates worldwide. In fact, West (1980) feels that t h s  agency 
is likely to have better knowledge regarding the probable ~ncidence of a 
political event than its clients. Ths  type of information helps guard 
against problems of adverse selection. 
In our proposed system, these data would be made available to 
private companies who would then supplement them with their own 
private data base. The same information-sharing would take place with 
respect to the settling of claims. Each private company who settles a loss 
with a chent firm would make these data available through a public infor- 
mation bank operated by a federal department or government insurance 
firm. All private insurance firms would have access to these data banks 
and hence could learn from the experience of others in making future 
investments. 
"~ccord in~ to  a recent article in Businass Weak (1981), multinationals worldwide paid $600 
to  $700 for political risk insurance in 1980, of whch about 8500 million went to government 
insurance agencies. For US companies about 40% of the estimated total of $100 million in 
premiums paid in 1080 went to private insurance companies. So far there are only four US 
carriers marketing political risk coverage in the US. The article further reports that the ma- 
jor complaint with such privately marketed insurance is its (perceived) exorbitant cost. 
Aisk Sharing b y  Investing Firm 
One way to deal with problems of moral hazard is to have some type 
of risk sharing by investing firms through a deductible or coinsurance 
clause. A deductible requires the individual to incur a mixed amount of 
the loss no matter how large the claim may be. Automobile contracts 
written with a $100 deductible requires the policy holder to pay the first 
$100 worth of damage. Coinsurance clauses require the individual to pay 
a fixed percentage of the loss. OPIC requires investors (except institu- 
tional lenders) to pay 10 percent of the risk (West 1980). Ths type of 
insurance clause acts as an incentive for firms to protect foreign invest- 
ments more carefully than if they were fully covered by insurance. 
h e m m e r a t  R e i m ~ a n c e  
One reason that private industry wants to insure their large forelgn 
investments against political risk is their concern about the possibility of 
incurring severe losses which may threaten their solvency. Private rein- 
surance companies have also been reluctant to share this risk. Some 
type of government reinsurance may be desirable, whereby private insur- 
ers pay a relatively small premium to a federal agency for protection 
against losses in excess of a certain amount. By agreeing to share the 
risk in this way then the government also has an incentive and responsi- 
bility to protect their own investments and intervene in the foreign coun- 
try if they feel this is necessary. 
A Prototype Program 
The National Flood Insurance Program provides an instructive exam- 
ple for designing a joint federal-private program for political risk. The 
program was enacted in 1968 as a means of offering federally subsidized 
flood insurance on a nation-wide basis through the cooperation of the 
federal government and the private insurance industry. The federal 
government, through the Federal Insurance Administration (FIA), identi- 
fies flood-prone communities, establishes insurance rates and policy 
terms, subsidizes premiums, provides reinsurance, sets standards of 
flood plain management, and enforces hazard mitigation requirements 
for participating communities. Up until the end of 1977 the writing of 
flood insurance was overseen by the National Flood Insurers Association 
(NFIA), an organization that represented a pool of 130 of America's major 
property and casualty insurance companies. The private insurance indus- 
try, under the auspices of the NFIA, committed a percentage of the risk 
capital, bore a portion of the expenses and insured losses, and, through 
licensed insurance agents and brokers, sold and processed flood 
insurance policies. 
Our proposed system of political risk insurance in the United States 
would follow a similar structure. The role of the Federal Insurance 
Administration could be played by OPIC. Private insurers would market 
policies to indwidual firms but OPIC would provide these companies with 
the data on the country risk in much the same way that FIA provides all 
private insurance firms with hydrological data on the flood hazard for dif- 
ferent river basins. If the estimated premiums were considered to be 
unusually high usmg the best available es.timates of the probability and 
consequences of certain events, then OPIC could subsidize insurance 
premiums to encourage foreign investment. Tlus policy would be similar 
to the subsidization of flood insurance premiums by the Federal 
Insurance Administration. Reinsurance on unusually large losses would 
be offered by OPIC in much the same way that  FIA handled reinsurance 
for catastrophic floods. 
The great advantage of this type of system is that it enables the 
private and public sector to each exhibit their comparative advantages. 
OPIC would be the central source for inlormation on country risk and 
losses over time; it would also help monitor projects and provide 
diplomatic and miLtary liaison to the Federal Government to safeguard 
strategic interests. Government reinsurance provides financial protec- 
tion to  the private insurance firms. 
The insurance industry could utilize its comparative advantage of 
marketing policies, settling loss claims and supplementing OPIC's infor- 
mation base on country risk by collecting data on the costs and benefits 
of each specific investment project. As more data became available on 
how different projects fared, then insurance premiums could be adjusted 
to  reflect actuarial risk levels. 
We should bear in mind however that the rate settmg process is not 
likely to reach a stable equilibrium. When i t  comes to  insuring against 
international hazards one has to  be prepared for surprises. The great 
challenge with respect to firms and insurers improving their decision 
making process is to harness these surprises to allow efficient risk- 
sharing and investment in the international arena. 
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